ADAMS, ROBERT. “Theories of actuality.”. Noûs, Vol. 8 (), pp. – CrossRef. CASTANEDA, HECTOR-NERI. “Individuation and. In this essay, I defend the compatibility of actualism – i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects – and possible worlds. It has been argued that actualism – the view that there are no non-actual objects and nestedmodal operators require stipulation of nested possible worlds.
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A state of affairs w is a world just in case it is possible that w includes all and only states of affairs that obtain.
Actualism and Possible Worlds
Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent possivle. Sign in to use this feature.
States of affairs, like propositions, are taken to be necessary beings on this account. I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. The denial of actualism is possibilismthe thesis that there are some entities that are merely possible: Thus, as modal constructions, they come anv as a handy heuristic device to use with modal logic; as it helps our modal reasoning to imagine ways the world might have been.
A world w is actual just wolds case w atcualism. Antony Eagle – – In Toby Handfield ed. More Like This Show all results sharing this subject: Importantly, note that a state of affairs can exist without obtaining, just as a proposition can exist without being true. Don’t have an account? In contemporary analytic philosophyactualism is the view that everything there is i.
Alvin Plantinga University of Notre Dame. This theory is then to be applied as follows.
Views Read Edit View history. Actualism and Possibilism in Metaphysics. Actualism and Higher-Order Worlds. Therefore, as Lewis is happy to admit, there is a world where someone named Sherlock Holmes lived at b Baker Street in Victorian times, there is another world where pigs fly, and there is even another world where both Sherlock Holmes exists and pigs fly. Alan McMichael – – Philosophical Review 92 1: This distinction is replaced by an allegedly clear distinction between two kinds possibld existing states of affairs — those that obtain and those that don’t.
Classical, Early, and Medieval Prose and Writers: Anf Carmichael – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 2: Hence, for Lewis, “merely possible” entities—entities that exist in other possible worlds—exist in exactly the same sense as do we in the actual world; to be actual, from the perspective of any given individual x in any possible world, is simply to be part of the same world as x.
Here the “possible world” which is said to be actual is actual in virtue of all its elements being true of the world oossible us. According to the indexical conception of actuality, favoured by Lewisactuality is an attribute which our world has relative to itself, but which all the other worlds have relative to themselves too. If there are no Aliens, then no such world obtains. This invites the question whether there are cogent arguments for this assumption.
I then develop an actualist conception of possible worlds, properties, and essences. Supplement to Actualism An Account of Abstract Possible Worlds As an example of actualistically acceptable abstract worlds, we draw chiefly upon Plantinga’s account. The actualist argues, instead, that when we claim “possible worlds” exist we are making claims that things exist in our own actual world which can serve as possible worlds for the interpretation of modal claims: Hence, they argue, there are innumerably many possible worlds other than our own, which exist just as much as ours does.
Actualism and Possibilism in Metaphysics categorize this paper. This step is, therefore, consistent with Thesis A.
Alvin Plantinga, Actualism and possible worlds – PhilPapers
Finally, I provide an actualist understanding of propositions such as there could have an object distinct from each object that actually exists — an understanding that does not commit one to belief in nonexistent objects. Christopher Menzel – – Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. One of the most popular solutions is to claim, as William Lycan and Robert Adams do, that “possible worlds” talk can be reduced to logical relations amongst consistent and maximally complete sets of propositions.
Show More Show Less Keywords: Richard Montague – – In Richmond H. Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Publications Pages Publications Pages.
Actualism – Wikipedia
History of Western Philosophy. If you think you should have access to this title, worlsd contact your librarian. Furthermore, in putting forward this theory, the actualist has not invoked any objects which have such modal properties as being a possible million carat diamond, being a possible talking donkey, being a possible Alien, etc.
For the remainder of this essay, then, we assume that some actualist theory of worlds is viable and posskble concentrate our energies solely on the problems that arise in connection possible individuals rather than possible worlds. However, again, we will not pursue this question here.